Recorded at 3pm EST on 19th November.
For Episode 105, we are joined by Brad Lundy of Butler Hall Capital, a 20-year long/short veteran who started as a floor options trader and now hunts cash-generative businesses in the $1 to $25 billion market-cap no-man’s-land.
Show Notes
How Butler Hall Played AI
Firm style: private equity approach to public markets; buys cash-generative businesses at an inflection toward accelerated growth, mostly in old-economy sectors.
Early AI winners bought cheap: Vistra Energy at ~5x cash flow (AI power demand), Vertiv at ~8x earnings for a cooling business growing 50%+ per year. Effectively free options on AI TAM.
Capex trajectory: a couple of hundred billion in 2024 to a Morgan Stanley estimate of roughly $1.64 trillion in 2027. AI capex is now effectively the crux of the economy.
Current stance: neutral. Too tough to call; requires underwriting capex into 2029 and 2030. Key distinction: recurring revenue from installed data centers is preferable to pure capex-cycle exposure.
Funding mix has shifted from hyperscaler cash flow to private markets and debt, adding credit-market dependency.
Cyclicals and Valuation (Minute 6)
Best industrials entries historically occur when multiples look high because earnings are at trough, not when they screen cheap.
NVIDIA: cheap-vs-expensive depends entirely on what AI capex does over the next decade. If earnings go up 100x, paying even 10x is risky.
Brad is bullish on AI for society, bearish-to-neutral on underwriting AI equities.
Employment impact: an entry-level analyst can now be replaced for about $1,000 a month, which has real value but raises questions about who trains the next generation of analysts.
Token costs are declining ~90% while pricing rises short term; not obviously sustainable. Benefit likely flows to society at large, not one dominant company owning the next internet.
Decline of Active Management (Minute 9)
Post-2020s active managers left, moved to platforms or launched their own shops; the next generation is effectively absent.
Old regime: valuation anchored capital allocation, so a 20% drawdown in a cheap stock attracted buyers and self-corrected.
New regime: a cheap stock down 20% picks up negative momentum factors, index ejections, and platform selling, and can fall 70 to 90% before recovering.
Consequence: invest with a 5 to 10 year horizon; short-term price action can do almost anything.
The key determinant of success is now the ability to hold a position through pain (liability structure) - the horizon required is shorter than five years in practice but the principle stands.
Butler Hall book: 30 to 40 longs, roughly 100% long / 60% short.
Sizing driven by capital at risk, not expected return: targeting max ~150 bps portfolio loss per long, so a 50% downside name maxes out around 3%.
Result: low portfolio-level volatility despite frequent 50%+ single-stock drawdowns, which they treat as exploitable.
The Cash-Return Mechanism (Minute 13)
10% free cash flow yield used to be attractive; now 20% yields are findable, but cheapness alone is not enough.
Without buybacks or actual cash return to shareholders, there is no timing mechanism for self-correction; a double that takes five years is a poor return.
Focus: businesses inflecting from ~3% growth to 10 to 15%, plus accelerating cash return, to survive the volatility.
Broken Earnings-Revision Correlation (Minute 15)
Last five months: AI/data-center names posted big beats and upward revisions, yet the trade broke down, inverting the usual correlation between revisions and price.
Rarer behavior that historically predates major unwinds (dot-com analogy).
Host counterpoint: sell-side numbers could simply be wrong. Brad agrees the market is telling you capex comes down, and if it does, AI-exposed names at ~50x pre-euphoria earnings with margins 2 to 3x normalized are precarious.
Signs of Life: Housing-Exposed Stocks (Minute 17)
Small and mid caps are in a bear market, but housing-exposed names (renovation, furniture, pools) started rising on negative revisions from September.
Pool demand is ~35% below normalized levels (~60k installs vs a peak of 117k in COVID), so earnings are terrible, yet stocks bottomed. Suggests markets overshoot on both ends.
COVID-era parallel (Q3/Q4 2020): stay-at-home winners crushing earnings were not indicative of long-term value. Market now over-prices near-term earnings relative to long-run cash generation.
Private Equity and Private Credit (Minute 23)
Private credit: structurally asymmetric (limited upside, full downside on impairments); expects subpar returns for a period but not the existential crisis feared 6 to 12 months ago.
Anthropic/SpaceX IPO proceeds likely recycle into private markets; legacy PE vintages may struggle to monetize at marks.
Decade-long lockups demand a meaningful return premium over publics to compensate for illiquidity.
Google, Meta, Amazon and peers have effectively compressed into one thematic AI bet, concentrating S&P risk in a single trade.
Goldman tracking: share of S&P 500 names inversely correlated to the index on a daily basis hit ~20% around Q2 and ~40% by September; never before have ~200 index names been negatively correlated. Echoes of 1999 to 2000.
Reading: it is possible to build genuinely uncorrelated portfolios today, and the anomaly is likely an omen.
Bear Markets and Recession Risk (Minute 28)
Allocators likely need 2 to 3 years of subpar index returns before changing strategy; 2022’s drawdown reinforced buy-the-dip behavior.
Most market participants under ~41 have never seen a real bear market; recent declines (tariff day 2025, 2020) were violent but brief, conditioning aggressive dip-buying.
First regime where AI capex is effectively the entire driver of GDP growth, now equity- and debt-fueled. A fall from $1.6 trillion (2027) to ~$1 trillion (2029) could trigger a real recession given the economy-wide multiplier.
Scale illustration: SpaceX estimated ~$150 billion of 2027 cash burn to be debt financed, versus the panic a couple of billion of Tesla burn caused years ago. If that credit does not come through, the trickle effect is enormous.
Brad’s framing: not a bear, just highlighting the risk. Either the $1.6 trillion of capex produces returns or it does not; both paths are volatile, and he would rather buy quality at depressed multiples with macro-agnostic returns.
Housing, Pools, and Consumer Staples (Minute 36)
Not dangerously early on housing-derivative names: many down 50%+ from peaks with good balance sheets; favor remodel exposure over new-build sensitivity. Historical pattern: prolonged underproduction is eventually followed by overshoot to the upside.
Staples: GLP-1s, private label penetration, and input inflation have crushed the sector, creating chances to buy under-earning, recurring businesses at 6 to 8x cash flow (not the XLP megacap staples).
Example long: a UK prepared-foods company at ~10x earnings growing earnings 15 to 20%, roughly 25% salad-exposed, gaining share as supermarkets reallocate shelf space to prepared foods for higher sales per square foot.
Anecdote: a merger with the number two competitor made reported guidance look like a miss (consensus reflected both businesses; guidance reflected partial-year consolidation). Stock dropped ~20% on a non-fundamental optics issue, they added, and guidance was raised the following two quarters.
Small/mid cap lesson: 20%+ moves on non-fundamental noise are common and represent gifts if you can identify them.
M&A as a Value Signal (Minute 44)
Takeout premiums are not a major driver of returns, but attempted or failed M&A is a strong signal of hidden value and a prompt for time allocation.
L’Occitane example: orphaned Hong Kong listing at half the valuation of global skincare peers; the controlling shareholder’s (later withdrawn) take-private bid flagged value, and the buried asset turned out to be Sol de Janeiro, grown from ~$100 million to ~$800 million revenue at ~20% operating margins in a few years.
Fever Tree: Molson Coors taking a significant equity stake and US distribution rights is read as a similar statement of underlying opportunity.
Conviction vs Price (Minute 48)
Core test: assume the stock drops 20% immediately after purchase on bad news; if you would not add, you should not own it.
Other areas watched: beaten-down consumer/retail (hard to underwrite due to fad risk), recurring industrials tied to onshoring and installed data-center replacement demand, and US natural gas/LNG as a durable long-term growth market.
Biggest career mistakes: failing to recognize when an industry tailwind turned into a headwind (coal in 2011 example). Industry health, moat, and return on capital are the foundational screens.
Volatility is a gift, full stop; de-emphasize monthly mark-to-market and focus on where earnings go over the next couple of years. Sizing on capital at risk enables exploiting weeks like the current one.
Heavy premium on management capital allocation: most holdings return cash via buybacks and dividends; where they do not, reinvestment must clearly beat buybacks. Worst outcomes come from capital misallocation.
Active engagement: direct, friendly-but-firm communication with portfolio companies about fiduciary duty to shareholders.
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